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September ~ 1973 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD {D., MONT.) , 
I 
t Mr. President, 
j 
l It is time for America to replace a policy of foreign landbased 
military omnipresence with a policy of discerning internationalism. 
The amendment I have offered will stimulate that process. Its 
provisions are not complex. In brief it will 
(l) require a reduction by 50% of the landbased military 
personnel stationed on foreign soil over a three-year period~ 
{2) provide that at least 25% of the total be accomplished in 
each of the three years; 
(3) permit the Executive branch total discretion to determine 
from which countries these reductions will be made. 
The amendment simply recognizes that approximately 500,000 
military personnel are presently stationed on foreign soil and seeks 
to reduce this figure to approximately 250,000 by June 30, 1976. 
The amendment would not affect or reduce the additional 100,000 
military personnel afloat off foreign shores. Thus, under the terms 
of the amendment approximately 85 ,000 military personnel must be 
returned to the United States by June 30, 1974. The President 
would have total discretion from which countries these 85,000 
could be removed (i.e., Okinawa and Thailand could account for 
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the entire 85,000 if the President chose to return these troops 
horne). Only foreign shore based military personnel would be 
included in the computation for eligibility for reduction. 
And lastly, the amendment remains neutral on the question of 
demobilization of the personnel returned. It is my belief that the 
'•. 
pressures to maintain a standing Army in peacetime through volunteers 
will significantly shrink the overall size of the military force 
levels. In this respect this amendment would complement that 
forecast and complement as well the unanimous action by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee which recommends an overall force level 
reduction of 156,000 by June 30, 1974. 
The enactment of this amendment would be totally consistent 
with the Nixon Doctrine of worldwide presence manifested by other 
than land forces on foreign soil. 
Action by the Congress is long overdue. The United States 
has stationed overseas more than 500,000 military personnel. In 
addition another 100,000 of milita ry pe rsonne l are afloat away from 
our shores. Thus approximate ly 30% of our military force is statione 
beyond our homeland. Not since the days of t he British Empire--
or probably more truly, the Roman Empire--have so many been required 
to "maintain the peace" away from our shores . Many of our Post 
world war II military posture s and we apons procurements, and those 
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of the soviet Union as well, have been imitative or mirrored responses 
to each other. When one superpower develops a missile the other 
responds in kind. 
If only that policy of mirrored action were applied to th' 
stationing of u.s. forces on foreign soil. 
The Soviet Union has stationed outside the Soviet Union 
approximately 345,000 military personnel; of this total 330,000 are 
stationed in Eastern Europe. It is presumed that many of these 
Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe are there for other than an 
external threat from the West. But notwithstanding the comparatively 
restrictive military overseas policy of the Soviet Union, the 
United States is badly overextended abroad. The presence on foreign 
soil of so many u.s. military presumes a policy that heavily favors 
the military option. In fact it is my belief that the commitment 
and level of U.S. forces abroad has determined our policy rather 
than our policy determining the level of U.S. forces abroad. 
It is almost beyond belief to most Americans that our country 
maintains over 2,000 bases and installations on foreign soil; that 
the Defense Department employs directly or indirectly approximately 
173,000 foreign nationals at these bases and the installations to 
support these u.s. Forces abroad; that over 314,000 dependents are 
stationed overseas with these military forces. Disbelief turns to 
dismay when announcements are made that bases and installations 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 49, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
'· I 










are to be closed in the United States and persons put out of work all 
in the interest of economy. Economy is a desirable goal but it should 
apply to expenditurts abroad as well as expenditures at home. The 
impoundment by this Administration of $12 billion for domestic 
programs; the devaluation and other weakenings of the dollar over 
the past two years approach 50%; all marshall attention to this 
policy of shameful overseas waste. It cannot be tolerated any longer. 
The amendment now pending is directed worldwide and not 
specifically at Europe. The public debate over the years has 
focused primarily on Europe because it is there that the largest 
contingent of U.S. Forces is stationed. But equally forceful 
questions can be raised to the U.S. troops stationed in Thailand--
now about 45,000; or in Okinawa--now about 40 ,000; or Korea--also 
about 40,000; or Taiwan--about 8,000; or the Philippines--about 
15,000; or even Bermuda where about 1,000 men defend our national 
interests. In fact, this amendment could be fully carried out during 
the first two years of its operation by reductions entirely from 
the areas I have mentioned, Thailand, Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, 
Philippines and Bermuda, without removing one soldier from the 
European Theatre. 
But since Europe has become the symbol and for the opponents of 
any troop reduction, their strongest case , it should be useful to 
, •. .... '!7' _,_,. (" . . , 




examine the premises and view the weaknesses of this--the strongest 
case. Let us look at the realities that faced this Nation in 1951 
which precipitated the stationing of four divisions in Europe. Let 
us look at the premises upon which the Congress assented and the 
representations that were made about the permanence of such a 
commitment of manpower abroad. Then let us look at Europe and the 
U.S. today, 28 years after the War, 23 years after the initial 
stationing of these divisions to NATO. 
EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II 
World war II left Western Europe in ruins. The United States 
moved swiftly with the most massive reconstruction effort ever 
attempted with its Marshall Plan--an effort that has proven 
successful beyond expectations. The institutions of Europe, 
political, economic as well as military, were in shambles. With 
these weakened conditions in Europe combined with the common 
perception of the threat of the hordes from the East a strong 
military presence in Western Europe to complement the economic 
effort was rational. But the North Atlantic Treaty, ratified in 
1949, did not commit U.S. troops to the European continent. In fact, 
the Treaty itself made no commitment of U.S. ground troops to Europe. 
It was not until 1951 that the decision was made to send four land 
• > 
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divisions to Europe and Congressional assent solicited to 
this significant commitment of troops. 
The history of proceedings before the Congress are very 
revealing. 
' I > . ' 1'·· ''·\)' 
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time that there was nothing 
magical about four divisions. The level was selected based upon a 
judgment of our resources and their availability. If only the 
same standard were to be applied today. And why should it not be 
applied? 
But even more revealing is the exchange that Senator Hicken-
loeper had with Secretary Acheson when it was made clear that each 
signatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally make its own 
determination of its contribution of military equipment , manpower 
and facilities. In addition, Secretary Acheson envisioned the 
return of troops subsequently sent if the situation got better. 
But what conditions were envisioned in 195 1 that initially 
warranted the troops to go to Euruope and what thorny questions 
should be resolved for us to expect their return? Senator Smith 
of New Jersey sought this information from Gene ral Bradley in 1951 
and General Bradley felt the making of a peace treaty with Germany 
and the state of preparedness of the other nations of Europe as well 
as the aggressive intentions of the East were the chief irritants 






Well, Mr. President, I think the time has come when Congress 
must recognize that in the words of General Eisenhower, something 
l is "cockeyed" about U.S. troops stationed abroad. President 
j 
i Eisenhower later recognized that change was justified. He stated 
in 1963 that one U.S. division would be sufficient to fulfill our 
commitment to NATO. 
It is evident from these indicia of engagement with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe that the tension that existed in the early 
'50's has changed significantly. 
It is time that the U.S. recognized the existence of its own 
policy toward the East. The policy of this government should be 
consistent, not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in trade 
md cultural exchange and confrontation in military matters. There 
should be but one barometer by which this government guides its 
actions toward the East. 
But we have many barometers that provide such different readings 
for the same phenomenon. This dual standard for rationalizing 
our policies vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful 
focus. If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire 
to open markets and develop a mutual interdependency of East and 
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the 
economic sphere as they have with increased cultural and educational 
.· ...... 
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exchanges. It is a natural evolution of the events of the past 
decade. But in the military sphere--in the NATQ structure--what 
remains is a stale rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations from 
bygone years. 
THE MBFR 
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our 
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease ~n u.s. 
military presence should take place. 
But the time is never right for such action. Two years ago 
the argument was the policy of detente was underway and that nothing 
should be done that would disrupt the process, including the 
U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by Chancellor 
Brandt's "Ostpolitik." 
Today we find ourselves in a new situation. Success has been 
achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; the 
warsaw and Moscow treaties h~ve been concluded; the status of 
Berlin has been regularized; through the exchanges of visits between 
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnew a new and better climate 
has been created which allows us to talk about the Cold War in terms 
of the past. 
Despite this movement, we are being told that this ~s the 
"worst possible time" in which to take any action on the question 
of our forces in Europe. The bargaining chip is back. Negotiations 
.,._ -:--·· -.--... - -r ................. -:-. 





on mutual force reductions are to begin on October 30th of this 
year. 
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR nego• 
tiations will be even more complicated and lengthy than the first 
phase of SALT. Most informed and optimistic speculations are that 
the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps two to three years 
might be a reduction of no more than 10-15% on the part of those 
countries involved. 
Indeed, since the preliminary talks--i.e., talks as to whether 
there should be talks--were expected to take roughly five weeks 
and took about five months, my skepticism has been increased rather 
than diminished about MBFR. I really doubt that the United States 
can remain immobilized on the troops question for a minimum of two 
and possibly even four to fiv& years. So the argument to wait for 
MBFR really is a postponement of significant action indefinitely. 
UNILATERAL ACTION 
The questions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they 
were undertaken in a bilateral framework. The positioning of 
forces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to 
the other because of different logistical requirements will 
generate 19 different solutions equal to the number of participants 
at the conference. So the complexity of MBFR is magnified 19 times. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 49, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
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The wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty which left the question•' 
of specific troop commitments in the NATO command to be decided 
unilaterally by each country is abandoned in MBFR. Unilateral 
action on such a matter is the only practical method. Any nation 
entering into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only 
agrees in those negotiations to what she determines unilaterally 
she can do or must do in her own national interest. No negotiation 
with the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to reduce any 
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines 
that those troops are needed in the Eastern European countries for 
other than protection against an external threat. In like manner, 
if the Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops on other 
'. 
frontiers, or if she desires to divert a greater proportion of her 
resources to non-military interests, then the appropriate reductions 
by the USSR will be made--but only then. 
So unilateral action on our part to reduce U.S. troops in 
Europe, while still maintaining our commitment with a more wisely 
structured but significantly reduced level of troops could very 
well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the 
part of the Soviet Union. This is not unprecedented in recent 
history. Unilateral and independent actions taken by the United 
States and the Soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear tests in the 
.. . . 




atmosphere precipitated similar constructive independent responses 
on each side which ultimately led to the nuclear test ban treaty. 
So the arguments that unilateral action cannot lead to constructive 
responses are unwarranted. 
Unilateral action on the part of the United States might pro-
duce surprising and constructive results. What people fail to 
rBalize is that the Soviet Union, ever since World War II, has not 
only been acting, but reacting, within its military establishment. 
Much of the Soviet force was created at a time when the United States 
had clear nuclear superiority. Most informed observers, here and 
in Western Europe, agree that the Soviet Union is considerably more 
c0nservative and suspicious than the United States because of its 
historical experiences and the character of its society. 
Ye t no one seems willing to make allowances for the inertia 
of this military conservatism in the USSR. We forget that the 
speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well as our political leaders, 
regarding need for NATO strength and readiness are read in quite 
a different light by the Soviet leadership than we intend. It seems 
a simple proposition, that they trust us no more than we trust 
them, but we do not seem to be able to absorb this view and 
act upon it. 
But even more significant is the European reaction to any 
removal of U.S. troops f rom the continent. It is an accepted 





axiom that the Europeans would follow suit and reduce their 
conventional forces as well. 
What is the threat, then, that requires so many u.s. forces 
on the Continent? If there is a truly perceived threat of a con-
ventional war from the East, would not our European allies who 
~ .. . ~ . 
' 'l 
' '' '. 
are closer to the "threat" then respond by an accelerated commitment 
of resources? But no, they would relax as well, accept the detente 
and devote more resources to non-military ventures. Then why 
should we, 3,000 miles away, assume such arrogance as to perceive 
a greater threat to Europe than do the Europeans? 
I think the question presumes a rational answer but there is 
none. It does highlight, however, the dominance of the military 
posture in Europe by the United States. Since the formation of 
NATO, there has never been a Supreme Allied Commander who was not 
an American. U.S. perceptions of the threat are tolerated by the 
Europeans and why not--the u.s. is footing the greatest share of 
the cost. Sinc e it is really our nuclear response that the 
Europeans wish committed, their tolerance for our eccentricities--
including the World War II conventional war contingency--is very 
high. 






It baffles me why a properly structured U.S. military force., 
of one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions, in position to 
move rapidly along the German frontier, would not be even greater 
insurance against any form of pressure from the East. 
It would be more realistic to the type of improbable attack 
. :. ·~ 
·~r· 
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that might conceivably come from the East. It would permit American 
forces to be engaged from the beginning, thus allaying any fears on 
the part of the Europeans that the United States would not be 
involved in the event of a quick thrust into Western Europe. 
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN 
Mr. President, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary 
drain and balance-of-payments costs of our troops stationed over-
seas. I have deliberately left this point to one side in considering 
these questions because I believe the United States will bear the 
necessary costs to fulfill its international obligations. Our 
history will show that! But I believe it is clear that the United 
States can fulfill its international obligations abroad with a 
significant reduction of U.S. forces on foreign soil. 
I believe a focus on this issue can be gained at last because 
of the competition for resources at home. But these resources 
will be saved, not by trimming our sails on our international 
obligations but by trimming the waste from years of inattention 
to a rational international policy . 




The Senate is well aware that the overall costs of our .! ·, '1i~:. ~~~~;~ 
commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of 
$17 billion, including everything except strategic forces; that 
the direct annual operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S. 
forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately $4 
billion, and with equipment, over $7 billion; that the net balance 
of payments drain because of the u.s. forces in Europe is approxi- •.;-
.'' 
mately $1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing 
daily because of the United States' disadvantage because of 
inflation, successive devaluations of the dollar and other 
weakenings. 
A return to rationality on the part of the United States and 
its forces abroad would yield a very significant savings in 
resources to the United States. I have deliberately not addressed 
myself to the issue of whether the troops that should be removed 
from foreign soil should be demobilized. It is my opinion that a 
very sound international policy for the United States could be 
implemented with a reduction of 50% of the approximately 500,000 
troops stationed on foreign soil. 
The return of approximately 250,000 military personnel would 
reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing 
international and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate 
for demobilization. But I don't think that the question of 
I 
'' . I \ .. ,' ' ' •.' 
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demobilization has to be directly addressed at this time since I 
believe the pressures of obtaining a military armed force without ,., 
the draft will to a great extent resolve the issue of demobilization~' 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. President, the time has come to set aside the rhetoric 
of the Cold War used to justify a status quo of military involvement 
around the world. 
The time has come to recognize action that is long overdue, 
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinational 
negotiations that could take a decade or longer to recommend less 
than what is justified today. 
It is time now to respond to the spirit of detente, to the 
success of the Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of 
Europe, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more 
fully to the needs of our own people at home. 
I urge the adoption of the amendment. 
' ' 
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EVENTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
). Renewal of Franco-Soviet trade agreement. February 1973 •. 
~.U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to establish an emergency communications 
link (hot line). June 1963. 
3. Tripartite treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space, and under water. October 1963. 
~ Approval by President Kennedy of U.S. wheat sales to the 
U.S.S.R. October 1963. 
·· . 
~-~ U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement of exchanges in the scientific, technical, 
educational, cultural, and other fields. February 1964. ( ~) 
I U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugoslavia and Poland. March 1964. 
-1. Renewal of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement. April 1964. 
~/ U.S. Romanian trade discussions. May 1964· 
J U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular agreement. Signed June 1964. Ratified March 1967. 
/ ~ French-Soviet trade agreement. September 1964. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in desalination of sea water. 
November 1964 • 
,.1 Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee approval of the 
Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security. 
January 1965. 
I~ Franco-Soviet color television agreement. March 1965. 
/'/ Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. October 1965. 
':,- U. s.-U. S. S.R. consular convention. December 1965. 
Italo-Soviet cultural agreement. February 1966. 
;I !tala-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical cooperation agreement. 
April 1966 . . 
'' 
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,d Yugoslavia becomes full contracting party to GATT. April 1966. 
t 'i De Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. June 1966. 
l 
,:,1 Franco-Soviet scientific, technical, and economic agreement. June 1966. 
jf Franco-Soviet space research agreement. June 1966. 
.~~ Fiat-Soviet agreement for construction of a Fiat factory in Russia. 
August 1966. 
~ -1 Renault and Peugeot agreements with the U.S.S.R. regarding cooperation 
with Soviet motor industry. October 1966 • 
.J r/ Kosygin' s visit to France. December 1966. 
~~/Franco-Soviet consular agreement. December 1966. 
_:, ,; Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commission. December 1966. 
··' Establishment of Joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce. December 1966 
: t North Atlantic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing a willingness 
to explore ways of developing cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and 
the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966. 
'i Franco-Soviet atomic energy cooperation agreement. January 1967. 
,_ ,J Franco-Soviet trade agreement. January 196 7. 
c' Kosygin visit to the United Kingdom. February 1967. 
~:; Fanfani visit to Moscow. May 1967. 
l: Italo-Soviet agreement on cooperation in tourism. May 1967. 
-;,: Italo-Soviet consular convention. May 1967. 
",· Poland becomes full contracting member of GATT. June 1967. 
U.K.-U.S.S.R. establish London-Moscow teleprinter line. August 1967 • 
. ' ' 1 Harmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion of mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. December 1967. 
· ( Announcement of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space research. January 1968. 
·--;:~;'~:.!f)~< ~:ll~ ~~~7 ~-
)·. ·· , - ! - • . • 
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J r Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the U.S.S.R. January 1968 • 
. , . U.K.-U.S.S.R. scientific and t~chnological agreement. January 1968. 
' . ,, 
NATO declaration calling for discussions of mutual and balanced force 
reductions. June 1968. 
~; Signature of the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968. 
•/ _· Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the State of Bavaria 
and the U.S.S.R. September 1968. · 
.'/ v' U.K.-U.S.S.R. civil air agreement. December 1969. 
Franco-Soviet civil air agreement. December 1969. 
<( Italo-Soviet long-term agreement on the supply of Soviet natural 
gas to Italy. December 1969. 
f', Soviet-West German agreements on supply of Soviet natural gas to 
Wes t Ge rmany. February 1970. 
j Opening in Vienna of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on strategic arms 
limitation (SALT). April 1970. 
NATO declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions. May 1970. 
Signing of non-aggression treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Soviet Union. August 1970. 
. I President Pompidou's visit to the U.S.S.R. October 1970. 
Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet political 
cooperation. October 1970. 
Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. December 1970. 
;'\ / Creation of a new basis for SALT negotiations. May 1971. 
," ...... · 
Ouster of hard-line East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht. May 1971. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 49, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
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.. l , .. •,. Resumption of SALT negotiations. July 1971. 
' ·t 
' ' ~:.· t 
~ .. \; ' 
Soviet-West German agreement to open consulates in Hamburg and Leningrad. 
July 1971. 
·:· Signature of first part of quadripartite agreement on Berlin. September 1971. 
,',"'/ Chancellor Brandt's visit to the U.S.S.R. September 1971. 
{·• U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on exchanging information on 
certain missile testing activities. September 1971. 
~·' U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on improving the "hot line" between Washi.ngton 
and Moscow. September 1971. 
<· ~ Secretary Brezhnev's visit to France. October 1971. 
~ . Franco-Soviet agreement on economic, technical and industrial cooperation. 
October 1971. 
tl Romania becomes a full contracting party to GATT. November 1971, 
/ -· ·· Soviet-West German civil air agreement. November 1971. 
1 t- Ratification by the West German parliament of the West German treaties 
with the Soviet Union and Poland. May 1972. 
President Nixon's visit to Moscow. May 1972. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in the exploration of outer 
space. May 1972. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in solving problems of 
the environment. May 1972. 
I' U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on joint efforts in the field of medical science 
and public health. May 1972. 
'/I U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on expanded cooperation in science and technology 
and the establishment of a joint commission for this purpose. May 1972, 
. l 
\ . " ,, 
,. 
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-·· ( U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation between the American and Soviet 
navies to reduce the chances of dangerous incidents. May 1972. 
··, ,# Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972. 
Signing of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin. June 1972. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. three-year agreement on the export of 
U.S. agricultural commodities (especially wheat and feed grains). 
July 1972. 
t , . Settlement of U.S.S.R. lend-lease obligations. October 1972. 
• , 7 U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime agreement . October 1972 . 
Signing of U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial treaty. October 1972. 
1'1 Quadripartite declaration supporting East and West German membership 
I 
in the United Nations. November 1972. 
Signing of the basic treaty on relations between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. December 1972. 
Opening of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on mutual 
and balanced force reductions. January 1973. 
Soviet-West German 10-year agreement on the development of economic, 
industrial, and technical cooperation, and cultural and 
educational exchanges. May 1973 . 
'. 
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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Referred to the Committee on --------------and ordered to be printed. 
Ordered to lie on the tabla and to bo printed. 
AM1EN1D lVAJENT 
Intended to be proposed by Mr. ---~NSFIE_L_D __________ ··-------------··---··· 
(lnHr< UUe ot bW below) 
to.&xxxxxxxxxxx~n>biU 
H.R. --~?8§. __ _ , an Act t o au thori ze appropriations during 
the f iscal yea r 1974 fo r procurement of a i r c r aft , mi s sile s , naval 
ves s el s , t r acked combat vehic l es , t orpedoes , and o t her weapons, 
and r esea r ch, deve l opment , test and eva l uation f or the Armed Forces, 
vivr>Orrrmgpxxxfine:xxx;cmscNnrrev.fb'l lo'\Vii'i~~ and t o prescribe t he au thor-
i zed per sonnel stren~th for each accive du t y component and of the 
Se lec t ed Res erve of each r ese rve c omp onent of t he Armed Forces, 
and the mili t ary t raini ng student loads , and for ot her purposes, 
viz: At the appropria t e place in the bill insert a new section 
as follows: 
Sec. (a) The Secre t ar y of Defense shall take such 
action as may be necessary t o reduce, by not less than 50 per 
centum, the number of milit ary forces of t he United States assigned 
to duty in forei gn countries on March 1, 1973. Such reduction 
shall be completed not l ater t han June 30, 1976; and not less than 
one-fourt h of the t ot al r educ t ion required to be made shall . com-
pleted prior t o July 1, 1974, and no t less than one-half of such 
totnl r educt i on shall be completed prior t o July 1, 1975. 
(b) Notwi t hstanding any other provision of law, no funds may 
be e~)ended on or af t er July 1, 1974, to support or maintain mi11-
tary forces of the Un~ted St ates assigned t o duty in foreign 
count ries if t he number of such forces so assigned to such duty 
on or after such da t e exceeds a number equal to the number of 
such forces assigned t o such dut y on March 1, 1973, reduced by 
such number as necess ary t o comply \>lith t he provisions of sub-
section (a) of this section. 
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(c) As used in this section, the term "military forces of 
the United States" shall not include personnel assigned to 
duty aboard naval vessels of the United States. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 49, Folder 18, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
